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PROTECTIVE POWER FOR THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
Aaron v. Securities & Exchange Commission1
On June 2, 1980, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Aaron v. SEC and, in so doing, clarified what showings of
"scienter"2 are required when the Commission brings a civil action to en-
join violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, s section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 and rule lOb-5.5
The case arose as an SEC civil action against the petitioner, Peter E.
Aaron, and seven others. Mr. Aaron was a managerial employee of E.L.
Aaron & Co., a registered broker-dealer in New York City. Among Mr.
Aaron's duties were supervising sales made by the firm's registered repre-
sentatives and maintaining the "due diligence" files for securities in which
the firm served as a "market maker."6 One such security was the common
1. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
2. "Scienter," as used in the Aaron decision, refers to a mental state em-
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. The Court reserved judgment
as to whether scienter may also include reckless behavior. Id. at 686 n.5.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
6. "Market maker" is defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
3(a)(38), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(38) (1976) as
any specialist permitted to act as a dealer, any dealer acting in the
capacity of block positioner, and any dealer who, with respect to a
security, holds himself out (by entering quotations in an inter-dealer
communications system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell
such security for his own account on a regular or continuous basis.
A less technical definition appears in N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. RUSSO,
REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 3.03[1], at 3-9
n.28 (1977) ("A market maker is a firm which stands continuously ready to buy
and sell securities for its own account from and to brokerage firms and retail
customers. The readiness of such firms to make continuous markets is essential to
the existence of a liquid stock market.").
"Due diligence files" contain information compiled by market makers
through regular, unscheduled investigations of the corporation in whose
securities they are making a market. Market makers are obligated to keep abreast
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stock of Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corp. Despite the fact that
Lawn-A-Mat's financial condition was deteriorating, two of E.L. Aaron's
registered representatives solicited orders by making false and misleading
statements to the effect that Lawn-A-Mat was in good financial condition,
would be maufacturing a new tractor in the near future, and would be a
sound investment likely to increase in value. Lawn-A-Mat officials learned
about the misrepresentations and contacted the registered representatives
and Mr. Aaron, requesting that the practices cease; nevertheless, the prac-
tices continued.7
In February 1976, the SEC filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief
for alleged violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rule lOb-5 and, in May
1977, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted a permanent injunction against Mr. Aaron.8 Mr. Aaron ap-
pealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed, but noted that the Commission need only establish negligence to
enjoin violations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act or section 10(b) of the
1934 Act.9 The Supreme Court, on writ of certiorari, vacated the court of
appeals decision and held that the Commission must establish scienter to
enjoin violations of sections 17(a)(1), 10(b), and rule lOb-5, but not to en-
join violations of sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3).
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act are the
two primary antifraud statutes in the field of securities regulation. Because
both statutes contain general language, they have served as the basis for
various forms of litigation in this field.
Section 10(b) proscribes the use of "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance" in connection with the "purchase or sale of any
security... in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors." 10 Under this statute, the Commission promul-
gated rule lOb-5 in 1942. " Rule lOb-5 is.also broad, having adopted much
of its language from section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Unlike section 17(a),
7. Because Mr. Aaron maintained the due diligence files, he had addi-
tional information from which he could have determined that the statements
made by the registered representatives were false and misleading.
8. SEC v. E.L. Aaron & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,043 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1977), affdsub nom. SEC v. Aaron, 605
F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The district court failed to
address the scienter issue noting that "Peter Aaron's conduct under either a
negligence or a scienter theory of liability violated and aided and abetted viola-
tions of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws." Id. at 91,685.
9. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 680
(1980).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). The similarities between § 17(a) of the
1981]
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which relates solely to sellers, section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 apply to both
buyers and sellers of securities.
The broad application of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is furthered by
the statute's failure to limit parties who may seek relief thereunder. Four
years after rule 10b-5 was promulgated, the right of private parties to seek
damages resulting from violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 was
recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 1 2 Thus, after Kardon, sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5 were available to private parties, in addition to
their earlier-defined uses by the Commission in public enforcement ac-
tions. Only in recent years has the Supreme Court taken steps to limit their
scope of protection.'s
Until recently, the level of culpability required for a person to be found
in violation of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 was uncertain, particularly when
the SEC was seeking injunctive relief. Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court
had not ruled on the question of requisite culpability; accordingly, some
circuits had adopted some form of a negligence standard, 4 while other cir-
cuits required greater culpability.15 In 1976 the Court, in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,'6 held that scienter was required for a private party to recover
damages under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5. Following the reasoning of
Hochfelder, several circuits adopted a scienter standard for Commission
Securities Act of 1933 and rule lOb-5 are apparent when the language of the two
are compared.
12. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13. The most significant limitation appears in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). In this case, the Court held that one who is
neither a purchaser nor a seller lacks standing to sue for damages under rule
10b-5. Id. at 755. By the time the Court so held, a number of circuits had already
adopted such a rule of standing, first announced in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 956 (1952). An example of
parties excluded by the Blue Chip holding are security holders who are victims of
corporate mismanagement whose actions influenced security prices, but who
failed to sell their holdings.
14. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d
Cir. 1972) (good faith no defense); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 835,
855 (2d Cir. 1968) (negligence), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 519 F.2d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1965)
(more than fraud covered by statute and rule); Myzel v. Fields, 586 F.2d 718, 754
(8th Cir. 1967) (knowledge of falseness not required), cert. denied, 590 U.S. 951
(1968); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (flexible duty stan-
dard).
15. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1975)
(willful or reckless disregard for truth); SEC v. Coffey, 495 F.2d 1304, 1514 (6th
Cir. 1974) (willful or reckless disregard for truth), cert. denied, 420 U.S 908
(1975); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974) (scienter or conscious
fault), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
16. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
688 [Vol. 46
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enforcement actions. 17 The Second Circuit, however, reaffirmed its earlier
position that, in an SEC enforcement action, the Commission need only
establish negligence. 18 Certiorari was granted to reconcile the conflicting
positions taken by the various circuits. 19
In resolving the conflicting decisions regarding section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5, the Aaron Court relied primarily on the Hochfelder decision.20
Hochfelder involved a private action for damages brought by customers of
a brokerage firm against the firm's independent auditors. The customers,
having been swindled by the owner of the firm, charged the auditors with
aiding and abetting the practices of the owner by negligently conducting
audits which failed to expose his fraudulent activities. Thus, the Court was
called on to determine whether an allegation of negligence would support
a private action for damages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The Court
held that negligence was not sufficient to establish such liability, basing its
decision on the language and legislative history of section 10(b) and the
structure of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 21
While the Hochfelder decision reserved judgment on the scienter ques-
tion with regard to Commission enforcement actions, 22 the Aaron decision
is, to a large degree, guided by Hochfelder. The Aaron Court, reviewing
the Hochfelder decision, noted that the "plain meaning" of the language
in section 10(b) "clearly evinced a congressional intent to proscribe only
'knowing or intentional misconduct.' ",23 In support of this proposition,
17. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978) (must show
scienter); SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (must show
recklessness). But see SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1977)
(district court read Hochfelder as applicable to SEC enforcement action, but
court of appeals declined to abandon prior contrary holdings within the circuit).
18. 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The court of
appeals in Aaron was the same court which declined to apply Hochfelder to a
Commission enforcement action two years earlier in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
19. 444 U.S. 914 (1979).
20. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
21. The Court relied on the "plain meaning" of the statute's language and
the nonexistence of legislative history which contradicted the plain meaning inter-
pretation. Id. at 197-206. The Court found further support in the interrelation-
ship of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, noting that "[i]n each instance that Congress
created express civil liability in favor of purchasers or sellers of securities it clearly
specified whether recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional con-
duct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake." Id. at 207. Finally, the Court
noted that the negligence-based civil remedies under the Securities Act of 1933
were subject to "significant procedural restrictions not applicable under § 10(b),"
such as requiring the posting of bond to cover costs and shortening the relevant
statutes of limitations. Id. at 208-10.
22. Id. at 193 n.12.
23. 446 U.S. at 690.
1981] 689
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the Court referred to statutory language such as "manipulative," "device,"
and "contrivance. 24 Aaron also reiterated the legislative history of section
10(b) as discussed in Hochfelder.25 The Court concluded that the plain
meaning of the statute as construed in Hochfelder applied to any alleged
violation of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5, regardless of the nature of relief
sought.
26
In its determination, the Court rejected the Commission's contention
that the case should have been decided under SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc. ,27 rather than Hochfelder. Capital Gains involved
a Commission civil action for injunctive relief pursuant to section 206(2) of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.28 In Capital Gains, the Commission
sought to compel investment advisers to disclose to clients those securities
in which they had executed a pesonal transaction shortly before recom-
mending them as investments to their clients. 29 The Capital Gains Court
held that the Commission was not required to establish scienter to obtain
injunctive relief under section 206(2) of the 1940 Act, basing their decision
on the "philosophy of full disclosure" which pervades the securities laws
enacted during the period of 1933 to 1940,80 the fiduciary relationship
which exists between an investment adviser and his client,8 ' and the dif-
ferences between a legal action for damages and an action for equitable
relief.3 2 The Aaron Court distinguished Capital Gains primarily on
24. Id.
25. Id. at 690-91.
26. Id. at 691.
27. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1976).
29. The SEC wanted to eliminate the potential conflict of interest created
when an investment adviser recommended securities which he personally held as
an investment. By requiring disclosure of personal transactions recently executed
in securities recommended, the Commission sought to decrease the incidence of
"scalping," a practice where the investment adviser would buy a security, recom-
mend it to his clients for long-term investment, and sell his holdings when the
market price rose due to increased demand for the security.
30. 375 U.S. at 186.
31. Id. at 191-92.
32. Id. at 192-95. Of particular importance with regard to this point, the
Capital Gains Court noted that" '[f]raud has a broader meaning in equity [than
at law] and intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary element.' "
Id. at 193 (quoting DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 235 (2d ed.
1956)). The Court further noted:
There has also been a growing recognition by common-law courts that
the doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions in-
volving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale
of such intangibles as advice and securities, and that, accordingly, the
doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue.
Id. at 194 (footnote omitted). It was the contention of the Commission that this
rationale made Capital Gains the guiding precedent for the Aaron decision.
[Vol. 46
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legislative history and language, and the applicability of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 to nonfiduciary settings. ss
In answering the scienter questions regarding section 17(a), the Aaron
Court utilized a "plain meaning" test to interpret the statute. Noting that
there was little precedential authority to guide it, ' the Court stated the
test as follows: "[I]f the language of a provision of the securities laws is suf-
ficiently clear in its context and not at odds with the legislative history, it is
unnecessary 'to examine the additional considerations of 'policy'... that
may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute.' "35
Applying this standard, the Court found section 17(a)(1) to require a
showing of scienter. It stated that "[t]he language of § 17(a)(1), which
makes it unlawful 'to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,'
plainly evinces an intent on the part of Congress to proscribe only knowing
or intentional misconduct. s86 The Court reasoned that "device,"
"scheme," and "artifice" could not be used to describe merely negligent
activities . 7 On the other hand, it found no scienter requirement under
sections 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3) because the language of the two subsections
failed to include any references to a mental state.A8
33. 446 U.S. at 694-95. Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, main-
tained that Capital Gains was controlling precedent and that the Court's distinc-
tions were unpersuasive. Blackimun believed that the differences between Capital
Gains and Aaron existed because, in Capital Gains, an "omission to state material
facts" was involved, while in Aaron, "actual dissemination of material false
statements" had occurred. The fiduciary relationship was necessary in Capital
Gains only because omissions to act were involved and a fiduciary relationship was
necessary to create a duty of disclosure. Id. at 709-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in
part).
34. The Hochfelder decision was unquestionably the most significant prece-
dent available to the Aaron Court. Although Hochfelder established scienter re-
quirements under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, because of the similarities in language
between § 17(a) and rule lOb-5, some courts applied Hochfelder to § 17(a) ac-
tions, as well. Compare Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795-96 (7th
Cir. 1977) (scienter required under § 17(a)) with SEC v. World Radio Mission,
Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540 (1st Cir. 1976) (state of mind irrelevant) and SEC v.
American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001, 1005-07 (4th Cir. 1978) (no scienter re-
quirement under § 17(a)). Prior to the Aaron decision, the Supreme Court had
not addressed the scienter question with regard to § 17(a).
35. 446 U.S. at 695 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214
n.33).
36. Id. at 696.
37. Id.
38. With regard to § 17(a)(2), the Court stated that "the language of §
17(a)(2), which prohibits any person from obtaining money or property 'by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact,' is devoid of any suggestion whatsoever of a scienter requirement." Id.
Similarly, with regard to § 17(a)(3), the Court stated that "the language of §
1981]
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In approving a nonuniform culpability standard for section 17(a), the
Court reviewed the legislative history and concluded that, although the
history of the statute was ambiguous, it may be read consistently with the
plain meaning of the statute's language.3 9 Thus, the Court adopted the
plain meaning of the statutory language even though, in doing so, dif-
ferent levels of culpability were established within section 17(a).
Although the Aaron decision puts to rest the problem of conflicting
decisions within the federal courts, the analysis used is incomplete. In par-
ticular, the Court failed to address the distinctions which may be drawn
between a private suit for damages and a Commission action seeking in-
junctive relief. While there are strong policy considerations for requiring
scienter before damages will be awarded, these considerations are not
present in a Commission enforcement action. 40 This is the primary reason
that the Court's strong reliance on Hochfelder as guiding precedent is
troubling. The adherence to Hochfelder also disturbed Justice Blackmun
who, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented in part with
reference to the Court's required findings of scienter under sections
17(a)(1), 10(b), and rule lOb-5. 41 WhileJustice Blackmun took issue with
the Court's plain meaning interpretations of the law and its failure to
distinguish between fraud at law and at equity, his most vehement
disagreement was with the majority's "failure to appreciate the structural
interrelationship among equitable remedies in the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
and to accord that interrelationship proper weight in determining the
substantive reach of the Commission's enforcement powers under § 17 (a)
and § 10(b).1 42 Justice Blackmun pointed to "the consistent pattern in
both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act ... to grant the Commission broad
authority to seek enforcement without regard to scienter, unless criminal
punishments... [were] contemplated. '43 In addition, Justice Blackmun
disagreed with what he termed the "halfway house" approach adopted by
17(a)(3), under which it is unlawful for any person 'to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit,' . . . quite plainly focuses upon the effect of particular conduct on
members of the investing public ...." Id. at 696-97.
39. Id. at 699-700.
40. The Hochfelder Court wanted to prevent the securities laws from
becoming a vehicle for reaching a financially sound, but less than culpable
defendant (in common parlance, sometimes referred to as the "deep pocket").
Accordingly, the Court strictly construed § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 and determined
that mere negligence was not sufficient for a private party to recover damages
under the statute or the rule. While such considerations are relevant when the
remedy sought is private damages, they are wholly irrelevant in a public enforce-
ment action since damages are not at issue.
41. Justice Blackmun also wrote the dissenting opinion in Hochfelder.
42. 446 U.S. at 713 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
43. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
[Vol. 46
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the Court with regard to section 17(a) under which negligence is the ap-
propriate standard for violations of sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), but not
section 17(a)(1). While sections 17(a) and 10(b) were designed to operate
in harmony, Justice Blackmun noted that the Court's decision provides for
the anomalous result that, in certain instances of negligent misrepresenta-
tion, conduct by a seller may be enjoinable, but similar conduct by a buyer
may not be.44
A logical analysis of the opinion may be supportive of the decision. The
Court's interpretation, however, has deficiencies when applied in practical
situations. These problems become apparent if one inquires whether Con-
gress intended the SEC only to be able to prevent losses wrought by
deliberate acts to defraud, instead of empowering it with a flexible form of
public protection which would allow the Commission to enjoin negligent
behavior having similar potential to cause investor losses.45 The practical
implication of the narrow view adopted by the Aaron Court is that the
Commission will be unable to protect the public against losses caused by a
negligent party, except where such negligence can be characterized as a
section 17(a)(2) or section 17(a)(3) violation. In the words of Justice
Blackmun, "when misinformation causes loss, it is small comfort to the in-
vestor to know that he has been bilked by negligent mistake rather than by
fraudulent design, particularly when recovery of his loss has been fore-
closed by this Court's decisions." '46
The Supreme Court's decision does resolve an area of dispute, but the
resolution is based on strict construction of the relevant statutes, apparent-
ly with little consideration being accorded to the weakened protective
powers that are left to the SEC. As a result of this technical reading by
the Court, either greater dangers of loss will be transferred to the investing
public or courts will be forced to conclude that scienter is present in situa-
tions which, prior to Aaron, might have been answered otherwise. While
the Court's decision does not stand contrary to reasonable statutory con-
struction, a decision establishing less restrictive standards for Commission
enforcement actions also would have been possible without offending
44. Id. at 715 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). This seemingly paradox-
ical result is possible because the Aaron decision held negligence to be the ap-
propriate standard only for violations of § 17(a)(2) and § 17(a)(3). Since § 17(a)
only applies to sellers, equally culpable conduct on the part of a buyer will not be
enjoinable as scienter is required to find a violation of§ 10(b) or rule lob-5 (which
apply to both buyers and sellers). The paradox is even more apparent when one
recalls the similarity of the language in § 17(a) and rule lOb-5 and attempts to
reconcile the Court's requirement of different levels of culpability.
45. This dilemma provided the basic difference between the courts which
treated SEC enforcement actions in the same manner as private damages suits
and the courts which perceived different standards between the two types of ac-
tions. See cases cited notes 14, 15, 17 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
46. 446 U.S. at 716 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
1981] 693
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